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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
presumption.2 2 Rather than defer to an administrative agency's interpreta-
tion, the Fourth Circuit engaged in judicial interpretation of an agency
regulation to reach a decision3 43 The Stapleton court rejected the agency's
interpretation primarily because the majority found that the interpretation
was plainly erroneous and rendered the regulation inconsistent with the
Act.2 4 The Fourth Circuit correctly rejected the Director's interpretation on
the invocation issue. 245 While the Director's interpretation of the invocation
provision sufficiently comported with the language in the regulation, the
interpretation rendered section 727.203 inconsistent with the underlying
intent of the Act.2 4 The Fourth Circuit, however, adopted a position
regarding the use of nonqualifying evidence that renders section 727.203(b)
inconsistent with the Act. 247 The court held that an A.L.J. must consider
all relevant medical evidence in rebuttal?48 The Fourth Circuit's decision





A. Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Company: Does the Admission of Human
Factors Expert Testimony Violate Federal Rule of Evidence 702?
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 702) allows for the
admissibility of testimony of expert witnesses who possess some specialized
242. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (per curiam decision rejected argument
that § 727.203(a) mandated use of preponderance standard); notes 55-57 and accompanying
text (Hall, J., stating that claimants need not prove by preponderance of evidence existence
of facts necessary for invoking presumption).
243. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's per curiam opinion
in Stapleton).
244. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (Judge Sprouse analyzing the Director's
interpretation of § 727.203 under deference standards that Judge Phillips advocated).
245. See supra notes 175-99 and accompanying text (analyzing Director's interpretation
of § 727.203 under plainly erroneous standard).
246. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text (analyzing legislative history in order
to determine if Director's interpretation was inconsistent with legislative intent of Act).
247. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (comparing legislative history of Act
with Fourth Circuit's holding on allowable use of nonqualifying evidence in rebuttal).
248. See supra notes 214-36 and accompanying text (discussing per curiam holding that
adjudicators may consider in rebuttal stage all relevant evidence, without restriction, whether
qualifying or nonqualifying).
249. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (referring to how allowing in rebuttal
unrestricted consideration of all relevant evidence allows employers to defeat claims more
easily).
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knowledge if the testimony will aid the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in the case.' Congress, however, did not
intend that the federal courts admit all testimony proffered under Rule 702.2
The general test regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is whether
the jury can receive appreciable help from the testimony.' The United States
Supreme Court in Salem v. United States Lines Companyl held that expert
testimony is inadmissible if the subject matter of the case is within the
common knowledge of the average juror. The testimony, therefore, is
excludable at the discretion of the trial judge when the primary facts are
related accurately and concisely to a jury capable of grasping the issue to
which the facts relate and capable of drawing reasonable conclusions similar
to the conclusions that the expert witness would draw. 6 The trial judge has
broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony,
and the ruling of the trial judge should remain undisturbed unless the
appellate court finds that the trial court's determination is manifestly erroneous."
1. FED. R. Evil. 702. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a witness
qualified as an expert because of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert possesses scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the presented
evidence or in determining a fact in issue. Id.
2. See Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, Preamble, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974)- (rules
apply except when infeasible, or when they would work injustice); see also United States v.
Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 323 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule 702 does not
require admission of all proffered testimony).
3. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923, at 21 (3d ed. 1940) (appreciable help is relative
to and dependent on particular subject and witness).
4. 370 U.S. 31 (1962).
5. Id. at 35. The United States Supreme Court in Salem v. United States Lines Co.
held that expert testimony is not only unnecessary, but is properly excludable if, in the
discretion of the trial judge, lay witnesses accurately and intelligibly can describe to the jury
all the primary facts. Id. The Court further noted that the trial judge has broad discretion in
the decision of including or excluding the expert testimony, and the trial judge's decision
should stand unless manifestly erroneous. Id. The Court recognized that if the issue is only
arguably beyond the jurors' common understanding, the trial court should excercise discretion
in admitting the expert testimony. Id. at 37 n.6.
6. Id. at 35; see also 2 J. MooRE, MoorE's FEDERAL PRACTICE Rule 702, at 251 n.702.3
(2d ed. 1987) (Advisory Committee note under Rule 702 discussing that expert witness testimony
admitted on basis that witness would provide assistance to trier of fact). The most certain test
for determining when the courts should admit expert testimony is the common sense inquiry
into whether the untrained layman is qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible
degree the particular issue without enlightenment from the experts on the subject involved in
the dispute. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE Rule 702, at 251 n.702.3 (2d ed. 1987); see Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VArN. L. Ray. 414, 418 (1952) [hereinafter Ladd, Expert Testimony]
(expert testimony is necessary when issues are not determinable intelligently on basis of ordinary
judgment and practical experience).
7. See Salem, 370 U.S. at 35 (trial judge has discretion to determine if jury can
understand evidence/testimony accurately and intelligibly without using expert testimony);
Bridger v. Union Ry. Co., 355 F.2d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 1966) (although trial courts and
appellate courts may differ on admissibility of expert testimony, trial court's discretionary
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In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Company,8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the admissibility under Rule 702 of the
testimony of a human factors expert who offered testimony on the reasonable
perceptions of a person in the same situation as the plaintiff. 9 The Fourth
Circuit in admitting the human factors expert testimony establishes a prece-
dent for the admittance of human factors testimony in cases where an injured
party claims that through reasonable perception the plaintiff was unable
to foresee any injury under the circumstances.'"
rejection of expert testimony is insufficient ground for reversal); Schillie v. Atchison, Topkea
& Santa Fe R.R. Co., 222 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1955) (specifically holding that Eighth
Circuit would have reached different conclusion than district court, but affirming decision
because district court did not abuse discretion).
8. 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986).
9. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054. The court in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. noted that the
study of human factors is otherwise known as ergonomics. Id. at 1053. Frank Fowler, a noted
human factors expert, defines ergonomics as the study of how people interact with their
environment. See Fowler, Human Factors Analysis, 10 TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, 53, 53 (ergon-
omics is study of how humans interact with their environment); Note, Evidence-Expert
Testimony: Admissibility of Human Factors Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
60 N.C.L. REv. 411, 411 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony] (human factors
is study of all factors that combine to influence individual's decision-making process, including
past experiences, present feelings, and immediate motor response in terms of present situations
or environments).
Several commentators have written about the practical use of human factors experts in
relation to products liability cases and railroad crossing accidents, and in connection with the
use of human factors experts in determining the imposition of contributory fault. See, e.g.,
Messina, The Human Factors Expert in Tort Litigation, 20 TRIAL, Jan. 1984, at 38, 39-40
(discussion of human factors expert testimony concerning highway accidents due to faulty
highway design); Messina, The Human Factors Expert, 15 TIAL LAW. Q. 56, 61-63 (1983)
(discussion of use of human factors experts to avoid contributory fault); Peters,
PassengerWorthiness: Designing with the Human Factor in Mind, 18 TRAit, Nov. 1982, at 63,
63 (use of human factors experts to demonstrate that manufacturers failed to consider
foreseeable injuries in automotive design); Ryan, Human Factors Engineering for Consumer
Safety: A Perspective, 18 TRIAL, Nov. 1982, at 86, 87-88 (discussion of surveys and statistics
available to manufacturers on human reactions to certain products and conditions); Fowler,
Railroad Litigation and the Human Factors Expert: Why the Plaintiff Missed the Train, 4
Am. J. TRAL ADvoc. 621, 624-29 (1981) (discussion of use of human factors experts to
demonstrate how reasonable people would not see on-coming train due to railroad crossing
design); Perlman, Use of Human Factors in Product Liability Cases, 2 Am. J. TRIAL Aovoc.
47, 52-56 (1978) (discussion of use of human factors experts when courts subsequently have
held that manufacturers failed to provide safety features that were necessary to protect against
foreseeable injuries); Bliss & Robinson, The Role of Human Factors Specialists as Expert
Witnesses in Products Liability Cases, 51 Vis. B. BuLL. June 1977, at 35, 36 (discussion of
legal interest in using human factors expert witnesses). The human factors expert can dem-
onstrate that manufacturers should anticipate and avoid many product-related injuries long
before the product enters the market. See Messina, Human Factors in Tort Litigation, supra,
at 39 (expert analysis is based upon specific facts of accident and knowledge of normal human
behavior); Perlman, supra, at 48 (expert can determine extent to which manufacturer ignored
available knowledge about human behavior in design stage of product). The human factors
expert can demonstrate the designer's failure to minimize the consequences of human error as
the cause of an accident. Messina, Human Factors in Tort Litigation, supra, at 39.
10. See supra note 9 (outlining various situations in which human factors testimony may
provide testimony useful in avoiding contributory negligence).
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In Scott, plaintiff Margaret Scott brought a diversity action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Sears,
Roebuck & Company (Sears) after she suffered a broken leg when the heel
of her shoe caught in a displaced portion of a curb on the Sears property."
Returning to her car from the parcel post entrance of Sears, Scott walked
diagonally across the sidewalk, avoiding a series of metal grates, and
intended to step off the sidewalk onto the pavement at the third metal
grate.' 2 The concrete near the third grate had deteriorated, and the surface
of the curb was crumbling. 13 The curb where Scott snagged her heel had
deteriorated approximately three inches below the surface of the sidewalk
and the adjacent curbing.' 4 When one of Scott's shoe heels caught in the
displaced curb, she fell, breaking her leg.' 5 Scott alleged that Sears was
negligent in maintaining the sidewalk.' 6 At trial, Sears relied on a contrib-
utory negligence defense to avoid liability.' 7 To rebut the defense of con-
tributory negligence, Scott offered the testimony of Dr. Harry Snydor, an
expert in human factors.'" An expert in the field of human factors offers
11. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1053. In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff went to
Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Sears) to pick up a rug and upon leaving, she stepped on a defective
sidewalk. Id. The Scott court noted that Ms. Scott was wearing one-inch heels. Id. Scott, a
resident of Virginia, brought a diversity action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia against Sears, which had its principal place of business in Illinois.
Id.
12. Id. In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Scott testified that she noticed the gratings
and intentionally walked farther out towards the curb to avoid the gratings. Brief for Appellant
at 3, Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-2086) [hereinafter
Appellant's Brie].
13. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1053. The United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. noted that the location of the defective sidewalk
was near the parcel pickup entrance of Sears and was in a section of the sidewalk where the
concrete surface had deteriorated and the expansion joint had opened significantly. Appellant's
Brief at 3.
14. Appellant's Brief at 3.
15. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1053. In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff suffered a
severe fracture of the upper-right femur resulting in surgery, traction, 122 days of hospitali-
zation, and permanent disability. Brief for Appellee at 1, Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789
F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-2086) [hereinafter Appellee's Brie]. The district court noted
that Scott was an active and healthy 59-year-old woman before the accident. Id.
16. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1053-54.
17. Id. at 1054.
18. Id. The district court in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. noted the credentials of Dr.
Snydor, which included serving as chairman of the Industrial Engineering Department at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) for four years. Appellee's
Brief at 4. Dr. Snydor received a bachelor's degree in psychology from Brown University and
a master's degree and Ph.D. in experimental psychology from Johns Hopkins University. Id.
Prior to teaching at Virginia Tech, Dr. Snydor spent eight years in industry doing work in
human factors engineering, research, and development. Id. In 1970, Virginia Tech requested
that Dr. Snydor establish a human factors engineering degree program, and the program has
become a highly-recognized human factors program. Id.
The district court in Scott admitted the testimony of John H. Parrot, a construction and
engineering consultant who testified that the curb height was not uniform and that the curb
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testimony that discusses how an individual's past experiences, present atti-
tudes, and immediate motor skills influence the person's decision-making
process.' 9 Dr. Snydor testified at trial that the defect in the curb, although
open, was not obvious and, therefore, Scott was not contributorily negli-
gent.20 The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
admitted Dr. Snydor's testimony and returned a jury verdict for Scott.
2
Sears appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on two grounds.2 Sears argued first that
Virginia law required the exclusion of Dr. Snydor's testimony in a diversity
action because the testimony would prejudice the jury regarding Virginia's
contributory negligence law, which places a strict standard of care on
pedestrians who use sidewalks.? Sears contended that without Dr. Snydor's
had an unexpected slope of four to five inches. Appellee's Brief at 3. The district court,
however, refused to admit into evidence Mr. Parrot's additional testimony concerning the
safety conditions of the curb on the ground that Mr. Parrot was not a safety engineer. Id.
19. See Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony, supra note 9, at 411 (human factors includes
all factors that combine to influence individual's decision-making process).
20. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054. Under Virginia law, a pedestrian is contributorily negligent,
although he possesses no actual knowledge of a defective condition, if the defect is open and
obvious and if the pedestrian, in the exercise of ordinary care, could have and should have
seen the defect. See West v. Portsmouth, 217 Va. 734, 736-37, 232 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1977)
(defining duty of care imposed on persons using sidewalks). Accidental displacement of brick
or stone may constitute a defect in a sidewalk that is so open and obvious that the duty to
notice and avoid the defect rests on the pedestrian. Id. at 739, 232 S.E.2d at 766. Under
Virginia law, a person who is contributorily negligent for failing to exercise ordinary care
when using a sidewalk is barred from recovery. Id. at 738-39, 232 S.E.2d at 765. If the
accident occurs in broad daylight and involves an open and exposed defect, the burden rests
upon the injured pedestrian to demonstrate that outside conditions prevented the pedestrian
from seeing the defect or excused his failure to observe the defect. Id. at 737, S.E.2d at 764;
see also Town of Virginia Beach v. Starr, 194 Va. 34, 37-38, 72 S.E.2d 239, 239-241 (1952)
(plaintiff fell due to shallow crevice between expansion joints in sidewalk, but court held
plaintiff was at fault for her injuries); Hill v. City of Richmond, 189 Va. 576, 584, 53 S.E.2d
810, 810-814 (1949) (plaintiff fell due to depression in sidewalk, but court held plaintiff was
aware of defective sidewalk and defendant, therefore, was not liable for plaintiff's injuries).
21. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1052. In Scott, the jury awarded the plaintiff $125,000 in damages.
Id. at 1054.
22. Id. at 1054.
23. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Wratchford v. S. J. Groves & Sons held that under the Erie doctrine, a federal court sitting
in diversity must apply state law that defines and limits substantive law and obligations.
Wratchford v. S. J. Groves & Sons, 405 F.2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir. 1969); see also Reed v.
General Motors Corp., 773 F.2d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 1985) (although Erie doctrine requires
federal courts sitting in diversity to follow state substantive law, federal rules of evidence
apply in diversity actions); McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 164 (5th
Cir. 1983) (while substantive state law applies in diversity action, federal court applies federal
law to determine if sufficient evidence exists for jury question); Krizak v. W. C. Brooks &
Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37, 41 (4th Cir. 1963) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not state law
governs admissibility of testimony of expert "accidentologist"); supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of Virginia law of contributory negligence in cases involving accidents
on sidewalks).
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testimony, Sears was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 24 The Fourth
Circuit, however, held that federal law controls the admissibility of expert
testimony in a federal court sitting in diversity and that the admissibililty
of expert testimony under Virginia law was irrelevant.
2
Sears also argued that the human factors expert testimony concerned
matters within the common knowledge of the jurors.26 Sears contended that
the testimony of a human factors expert was inadmissible per se on the
ground that the testimony dealt with probable human reaction to environ-
mental conditions.27 The Fourth Circuit refused to adopt the per se exclusion
of the human factors expert testimony.28 In rejecting Sears' argument that
human factors testimony was per se inadmissible, the Fourth Circuit relied
on the liberal construction of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which grants
broad discretion to a trial judge in admitting expert testimony.29 The Fourth
Circuit recognized that a federal appellate court normally defers to a district
court's judgment regarding the admissibility of testimony. 0 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that a district court, pursuant to Rule 702, will exclude
testimony that is within the jurors' common knowledge because the testi-
mony is of no assistance to the jurors1.3 The Fourth Circuit, however, noted
that even if a district court admits testimony that is not helpful to the jury,
the admission of the testimony is usually harmless error, and an appellate
court should not reverse the case.32 The Fourth Circuit recognized that a
problem arises with human factors witnesses when the expert testimony
concerning human reactions supplants a jury's independent exercise of
common sense and possibly prejudices the final judgment.33 The Fourth
24. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054.
25. Id.; see supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussion of precedent establishing
that federal courts in diversity apply federal rules of evidence).
26. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054; see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing
admissibility requirements for expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702). The
Commonwealth of Virginia currently is in the process of codifying the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See 2 VminGA LAW RaPoRTS Part Seven, at 568, 598 (1985) (proposed Virginia
counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
27. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054.
28. Id. at 1054-55; see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Fourth
Circuit's holding in Scott).
29. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055; see supra notes 5 & 7 and accompanying text (appellate
court may reverse trial court's decision only if admission of testimony is manifestly erroneous).
30. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. found that the admission
of nonprejudicial testimony almost invariably will be harmless. Id. (citing United States v.
Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 148-50 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that admitted expert testimony on
personal photographic identification was harmless in light of all evidence allowed)); see infra
note 84 and accompanying text (admitted testimony is harmless when nonprejudicial).
33. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055. The Fourth Circuit in Scott reasoned that when an expert's
evaluation of a situation supplants the jury's role in exercising common sense, the testimony
may not pass judicial evaluation under Rule 702. Id. (citing Marx & Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc.
550 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1977) (expert testimony excluded when testimony enters jury's
[Vol. 44:505
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Circuit held that once the trial court admits evidence under Rule 702,
the lower court should apply Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (Rule 403) to
determine whether an expert's testimony might supplant the jury's exercise
of common sense and prejudice the final judgment.1
4
In reviewing the district court's admission of the human factors expert
testimony, the Fourth Circuit evaluated independently each piece of Dr.
Snydor's testimony to determine whether the district court admitted the
testimony in violation of Rule 702 and, if so, whether the admission of the
testimony was harmless error or prejudicial under Rule 403. 31 The Fourth
Circuit determined that the admission of Dr. Snydor's testimony concerning
the higher and closer section of the curb hiding the displaced section was
within the common knowledge of the trier of fact and, thus, was inadmissible
under Rule 702.6 The Scott court, however, held that the testimony resulted
in harmless error and was not prejudicial to Sears. 37 Dr. Snydor also testified
that the yellow color of the curb might cause a reasonable person's percep-
tion to fill in the discontinuities of the curb.38 The Scott court noted that
Dr. Snydor's testimony concerning the reasonable perception of the curb
contained some scientific basis.3 9 The Fourth Circuit recognized that the
admission of testimony having a scientific basis was proper under Rule 702
and was not an abuse of the district court's discretion. 40 The Fourth Circuit,
however, ruled that the admission of Dr. Snydor's testimony that the
crumbling of the concrete was an effective distraction was in violation of
Rule 702, because the jurors had an opportunity to view the curb in person
and to view color photographs of the curb that the district court had
province in exercising common sense), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977)). The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Collins noted that
the expert testimony proffered at trial failed to include sufficient factors necessary for the jury
to challenge the expert's credibility and that the testimony did not assist materially the jury
in analyzing the evidence. United States v. Collins, 395 F.Supp. 629, 637 (M.D. Pa. 1975)
aff'd mem., 523 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1975). The district court in Collins, therefore, held that
a substantial risk existed that the expert's credentials and persuasive powers would have a
greater influence on the jury than the evidence presented at trial. Id. Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence provides that although relevant, evidence is excludable when the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, or considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence substantially outweighs
the probative value of the testimony. FED. R. Evm. 403.
34. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055; see FED. R. EviD. 403 (relevant evidence is excludable if
potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading of jury, undue delay, waste or
cumulative evidence substantially outweighs probative value of evidence).
35. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055-56; see infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (discussion
of Fourth Circuit's holding in Scott concerning Dr. Snydor's testimony).
36. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055.
37. Id.; see infra note 84 and accompanying text (erroneous admission of nonprejudicial
testimony constitutes harmless error).
38. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055.
39. Id., 789 F.2d at 1055. The Fourth Circuit in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. held
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admitted into evidence. 4' The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court
admitted Dr. Snydor's testimony of the crumbling concrete erronously under
Rule 702, but held that the testimony did not violate Rule 403 because the
error was harmless. 42 The Fourth Circuit, however, found that Dr. Snydor's
comment that the deteriorating concrete was an "accident waiting to hap-
pen" was prejudicial to Sears because the statement was inflamatory and,
therefore, the admitted prejudicial testimony violated Rule 403. 41 The Fourth
Circuit, in remanding the case to the district court for a new trial, ruled
that the testimony of a human factors expert was admissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 at the discretion of the trial court unless the testimony
was prejudicial and, thus, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403."
Prior to the Scott decision, only the United States Courts of Appeal for
the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits had considered whether to admit the
testimony of a human factors expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.41
In Garwood v. International Paper Co.46, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the testimony of a human factors expert was
admissible under Rule 702 if the proffered testimony aided the jury in
determining the facts. 47 In Garwood, the plaintiff offered the deposition of
a human factors expert witness in an attempt to demonstrate that the
plaintiff's dive into the defendant's pond was reasonable conduct under the
particular conditions.48 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's exclusion
of the human factors expert testimony under Rule 702 because the human
factors testimony did not aid the jury in determining the facts. 49 The
41. Id. In Scott, the jurors had an opportunity to observe for themselves the accident
site. Id. Plaintiff Scott also submitted color photograghs of the curb at the point of her fall
as evidence of the sidewalk's deteriorated condition. Id.
42. Id. at 1055-56. The Fourth Circuit in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. found that the
district court failed to submit a jury instruction stating that the jury could use the crumbling
concrete as a basis for finding that Scott reasonably was distracted and, therefore, was innocent
of contributory negligence. Id.
43. Id. at 1056.
44. Id. at 1055; see supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Fourth
Circuit's two-step analysis for admitting human factors testimony).
45. See Collins v, Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 675 F.2d 1185, 1194-95 (11th Cir.
1982) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs admission of expert human factors
testimony); Garwood v. International Paper Co., 666 F.2d 217, 223 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding
that human factors expert testimony is admissible if testimony aids trier of fact under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702); see infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (discussion of Garwood
and Collins decisions).
46. 666 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1982).
47. Garwood, 666 F.2d at 223. In Garwood v. International Paper Co. the plaintiff,
Garwood, sought to offer the testimony of a human factors expert to show that Garwood
was not contributorily negligent in diving into the defendant's pond. Id. at 218-22. The district
court refused to admit the testimony. Id. at 222. On appeal, Garwood argued that the
testimony demonstrated that the environmental features surrounding the water into which he
dove created a situation where a reasonable person would not perceive the shallow water and
would have acted in the same manner as Garwood had acted. Id. at 222-23.
48. Id. at 223.
49. Id. at 223. The district court in Garwood also excluded the expert testimony because
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Garwood court, therefore, held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excjuding the plaintiffs human factors testimony concerning
the environmental conditions of the shallow water in a pond because the
evidence did not aid the trier of fact.
50
Following the Fifth Circuit's precedent, the United States Couit of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
Company5 held that the testimony of a human factors expert was admissible
under Rule 702 if the testimony aided the jury in determining the facts.
5 2
In Collins, the plaintiff's truck rolled onto the railroad tracks where the
motor choked immediately before the train struck the right side of the cab.
55
The plaintiff offered the human factor's expert testimony to support the
contention that the railroad crossing was dangerous. 54 The Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the federal courts liberally construe Rule 702 in determining
whether the facts are within the common understanding of the average
juror.5 5 The Collins court then stated that the average juror could not
understand the complex factors involved in the construction and maintenance
of a railroad crossing. 6 The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district
court's admission under Rule 702 of the human factors expert testimony
concerning the hazardous condition of the railroad crossing, and held that
the testimony would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the
railroad crossing was dangerous.
57
In contrast to the decisions of the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits, which
have held that human factors expert testimony is admissible when the
proffered testimony aids the trier of fact, Florida state courts have held
the issue of contributory negligence was not outside the common understanding of the average
juror. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, did not reach a decision on the contributory negligence
issue because the court held that the human factors testimony did not aid the jurors. Id.
50. Id.
51. 675 F.2d 1185 (l1th Cir. 1982).
52. Collins, 675 F.2d at 1194-95. In Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., the
plaintiff offered the expert testimony of Frank Fowler, a human factors safety expert. Id.
Fowler's experience included the investigation of several hundred railroad grade crossing
accidents. Id. The district court admitted the expert testimony. Id. On appeal, the defendant
contended that Fowler's expert opinion concerning the reasonably safe speed limit and the
degree of danger at a particular crossing were improper testimony for a human factors expert
witness. Id.
53. Id. at 1187.
54. Id. at 1194; see supra note 52 (outlining experience of human factors expert utilized
in Collins).
55. Collins, 675 F.2d at 1194-95.
56. Id. at 1195. The district court in Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. agreed
with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Bridger v. Union Railway Co. that to expect the average
juror to comprehend the diverse and complex factors of constructing and maintaining a railroad
crossing is absurd. Id.; see Bridger v. Union Ry. Co., 355 F.2d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 1966)
(appellate court should not disturb trial court's decision that expert testimony was required to
assist jury in deciding issues).
57. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Collins v.
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. held that the defendant's appeal based on the admitted
expert testimony was frivolous. Id.
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that human factors expert testimony is admissible when the testimony aids
the trier of fact only if an unusual fact situation exists in the case." In
Public Health Foundation for Cancer & Blood Pressure Research Inc. v.
Cole59 , the Florida District Court of Appeals for the Fourth District rec-
onciled two conflicting Fourth District cases concerning the admissibility of
human factors expert testimony 0 In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Com-
pany v. Hill", the Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
noted that the subject matter of a human factors expert's testimony must
relate to some science, profession, business, or occupation beyond the
common understanding of the average layman. 62 In Hill, the plaintiff's
decedent husband stopped his car during the early morning hours while it
was still dark on the defendant's railroad tracks at a crossing without any
warning signals. 63 The plaintiff in Hill offered the testimony of a human
factors expert to demonstrate that the defendant's train struck the decedent's
car because the crossing was unsafe 4 The Hill court found that the expert's
testimony concerning a reasonably prudent person's reaction to the railroad
crossing was within the expertise of the witness and beyond the scope of
the common knowledge of the jurors.
65
In conflict with the Hill decision, the Florida District Court of Appeal
for the Fourth District four years later in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v.
Kubalski66 ruled that the lower court erred in admitting a safety consultant's
testimony concerning the reasonable human reaction to a particular railroad
crossing. 67 The plaintiff in Kubalski had stopped on the railroad crossing
58. See Public Health Found. for Cancer & Blood Research Inc. v. Cole, 352 So. 2d
877, 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (human factors expert testimony is admissible when
sufficient unusual facts exist); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d 32, 34
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (expert testimony concerning reasonable human reaction improperly
admitted because fact situation did not contain sufficient unusual circumstances to warrant
expert testimony); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Hill, 250 So. 2d 311, 313-15 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971) (holding that sufficient unusual circumstances existed prior to decedent's
accident with defendant's train); see also Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony, supra note 9, at
412-24 (discussion of Florida state court treatment of human factors experts). At the time of
Public Health Found. for Cancer & Blood Research Inc. v. Cole, Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
Co. v. Kubalski and Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Hill the state of Florida had not
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 411 n.6 (noting that Florida did not adopt
Federal Rules of Evidence until 1976).
59. 352 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
60. Cole, 352 F.2d at 879. The trial court in Public Health Found. for Cancer & Blood
Research Inc. v. Cole admitted the expert testimony based on the Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
Co. v. Hill decision. Id. The defendants contended, however, that the Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
Co. v. Kubalski case governed the Cole decision. Id.
61. 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), writ discharged, 270 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1972).
62. Hill, 250 So. 2d at 314-15.
63. Id. at 312-13.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 315.
66. 323 So. 2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
67. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d at 33-34.
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in broad daylight with numerous warning devices sounding when the defend-
ant's train struck the plaintiff's car.6s The plaintiff offered the human
factors expert testimony to prove that the railroad crossing was dangerous. 6
The Kubalski court held that the jury should have assessed the facts and
circumstances solely on the basis of the jurors' common knowledge.7
0
The Fourth District decision in Cole reconciled the rulings in Hill and
Kubalski because Hill contained unusual circumstances sufficient to warrant
an intrusion upon the jury's province in deciding what a reasonable man
would perceive under the particular circumstances. 7 I The court in Cole noted
that no unusual circumstances existed in Kubalski to warrant an intrusion
into the province of the jury to determine how a reasonable person would
react.72 The Cole court concluded that sufficient unusual circumstances
existed to support the admission of expert testimony pertaining to the
deceptive quality of various environmental factors present prior to the
plaintiff's accident at the defendant's waterfront recreation area.73 The
Fourth District in Cole then reinstated the trial court's decision.74
The Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits have considered the admissibility of
human factors expert testimony with respect to Rule 702, but have not
addressed the issue of whether human factors expert testimony was preju-
dicial under Rule 403 and thus inadmissible.73 The Florida state courts are
in agreement that the admissibility of human factors testimony depends on
whether the proffered testimony is beyond the common knowledge of the
68. Id. at 34.
69. Id. at 33-34.
70. Id.
71. See Cole, 352 So. 2d at 879 (comparing different circumstances in Kubalski to
circumstances in Hill in deciding sufficient unusual circumstances existed in Cole to allow
expert testimony); see also Hill, 250 So. 2d at 313-15 (holding that fact decedent was stopped
on railroad crossing in dark weather with no warning devices constituted sufficient unusual
circumstances); Kubalski, 323 So. 2d at 34 (holding that fact that decedent was stopped on
railroad crossing in good weather during day light did not constitute enough unusual circum-
stances to warrant intrusion into jury's province of deciding reasonable person's reactions).
72. Cole, 352 So. 2d at 879.
73. Id. The court in Public Health Found. for Cancer & Blood Pressure Research Inc.
v. Cole held that the significance of an individual's reaction to the environmental conditions
present when the defendant dove into the river reasonably might involve issues that were
within the sphere of the witnesses' expertise and beyond the scope of the common knowledge
of the jurors. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Garwood, 666 F.2d at 223 (Fifth Circuit in Garwood excluded human factors
expert testimony because under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 testimony did not aid trier of
fact, court, therefore, did not question whether human factors expert testimony was prejudicial
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403); Collins, 675 F.2d at 1195 (Eleventh Circuit in Collins
ruled that complex factors existed which necessitated admittance of human factors expert test-
imony under Federal Rule of Evicence 702, court, therefore, did not need to question whether
expert testimony was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403); supra notes 46-57
and accompanying text (discussion of Fifth and Eleven Circuits' admission of human factors
testimony).
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jury.7 6 The Florida courts, however, impose an additional requirement that
sufficient unusual circumstances exist in the particular case to warrant an
intrusion into the jury's province of determining the reactions of a reason-
ably prudent person.77 The Florida courts, therefore, did not address the
issue of whether admitted human factors expert testimony was prejudicial
or whether Federal Rule of Evidence 403 restricted the admission of the
expert testimony.
7
Neither the Fifth nor the Eleventh Circuit considered the relevancy of
human factors expert testimony under Rule 403, and the Fourth Circuit in
Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Company was the first federal court to question
whether the admission of human factors expert testimony under Rule 403
was prejudicial. 79 The Fourth Circuit in Scott correctly adhered to the
requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.s0 The Fourth Circuit
noted that although Rule 702 is liberal in the admission of expert testimony,
the testimony must provide some assistance to the trier of fact.8' The Scott
court held that Dr. Snydor's testimony about the physical condition of the
defective sidewalk and the statistical evidence that persons wearing heels
tend to avoid gratings involved material that was within the common
knowledge of the jurors.82 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, correctly found
that the testimony failed to provide any assistance to the trier of fact.83
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the district court's decision to
admit the testimony resulted in harmless error.84 Consequently, the Fourth
76. See supra notes 65 & 70 and accompanying text (discussion of trend in Florida cases
to hold that human factors testimony must aid jurors).
77. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussion of Cole decision reconciling
Hill and Kubalski on basis of unusual facts existing in Hill that warranted admission of human
factors expert testimony).
78. See supra note 58 (discussion of Fifth Circuit's reconciliation of Kubalski and Hill
decisions); supra notes 59-68 (Florida courts had neither applied nor mentioned Federal Rules
of Evidence).
79. See Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055 (Fourth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Evidence 403
excludes expert testimony that might supplant jury's independent exercise of common sense if
admission of evidence also is prejudicial).
80. Id.; see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (outlining provisions of Federal Rules
of Evidence 702); supra note 33 and accompanying text (outlining provisions of Federal Rule
of Evidence 403).
81. Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055.
82. Id.
83. See id. (Fourth Circuit in Scott held that expert testimony repeated what was common
knowledge and common sense).
84. See id. (Fourth Circuit in Scott deferred to district court's discretion in allowing
expert testimony that was nonprejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
In interpreting the concept of harmless error in affirming a lower court's decision, the
United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power Equipment Inc. v. Greenwood held that
courts should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for error and that the
courts should ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial. McDonough
Power Equip. Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984). The Supreme Court, in McDonough
noted that the rule governing motions for a new trial in the district courts is contained in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 (Rule 61). Id. Rule 61 states that no error or defect in
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Circuit correctly held that the submitting of nonprejudicial evidence, re-
sulting in harmless error, did not warrant a new trial. 5
The Fourth Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit or the Eleventh Circuit, had
the opportunity to question whether human factors expert testimony ad-
mitted erroneously under Rule 702 was prejudicial testimony under Rule
403.16 The Fourth Circuit held that when a trial court admits expert testimony
that fails to assist the trier of fact as required under Rule 702, the appellate
court must decide whether the admitted testimony was prejudicial under
Rule 403, and, therefore, warrants a new trial."7 The Fourth Circuit found
that the admission of Dr. Snydor's testimony that the crumbling concrete
was an accident waiting to happen and that the trial judge's failure to
instruct the jury to disregard Dr. Snydor's testimony about the crumbling
sidewalk was prejudicial error.8  The Fourth Circuit in Scott, therefore,
correctly granted a new trial because the trial court admitted the prejudicial
testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.19
any ruling is grounds for granting a new trial unless the refusal to grant a new trial is
inconsistent with substantial justice. FED. R. Crv. P. 61. Rule 61 mandates that the court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error of the parties that does not affect the
substantive rights of the parties. Id. The Supreme Court in McDonough noted that Congress,
in enacting 28 U.S.C. section 2111, has reinforced the application of Rule 61 to the appellate
courts. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554. Section 2111 of 28 U.S.C. requires that appellate courts
in hearing an appeal or writ of certiorari shall examine the record without regard to errors or
defects that do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982).
According to McDonough, therefore, appellate courts should reject a motion for a new trial
when the motion is based on an error or defect that does not produce a substantial injustice.
See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556 (rejecting argument for reversal when admitted testimony
results in harmless error).
85. See Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055 (Fourth Circuit in Scott held that testimony admitted
that is within jurors' common knowledge, but nonprejudicial, is harmless error); see supra
note 84 and accompaying text (discussion of United States Supreme Court decision in Mc-
Donough holding that reviewing courts should exercise judgment rather than reverse decisions
for nonprejudicial error).
86. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (discussion of Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits' ruling on admissibility of human factors testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
702). The Fifth Circuit in Garwood v. International Paper Co. did not have an opportunity
to discuss if the human factors expert testimony was prejudicial, because the court excluded
the evidence on the ground that the testimony did not aid the jury. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text (Fifth Circuit's holding on admission of human factors expert testimony).
The Eleventh Circuit in Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. did not discuss whether
human factors expert testimony is prejudicial, because the court admitted the testimony on
the basis that the testimony aided the jury due to the complex nature of the crossing. See
supra, notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussion of Eleventh Circuit's admission of human
factors expert testimony); supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that neither Fifth
Circuit nor Eleventh Circuit resolved expert testimony question on Federal Rule of Evidence
403).
87. See Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055-56 (admission of prejudicial testimony under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 warrants new trial).
88. Id.; see supra note 42 (Fourth Circuit in Scott held district court's failure to instruct
jury on Virginia contributory negligence law was prejudicial).
89. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Fourth Circuit's holding
that testimony admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 also must survive consideration
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
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The decision in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Company represents the Fourth
Circuit's willingness to admit human factors expert testimony that the trial
court has approved under Rule 702. 90 The Fourth Circuit, nevertheless, will
not admit automatically the human factors expert testimony.91 The Fourth
Circuit reserves the opportunity under Rule 403 to grant a new trial if the
expert testimony is prejudicial. 92 The Fourth Circuit extended the approach
of the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits, which admitted human factors expert
testimony that aided the jury in deciding the facts, to include an evaluation
of whether the admitted expert testimony was prejudicial under Rule 403. 93
The Fourth Circuit's approach also differs from the Florida state courts'
position by not requiring that unusual circumstances exist before the court
will permit human factors expert testimony concerning the reactions of
reasonably prudent persons.9 4 The significance of the Scott decision is that
the Fourth Circuit closely follows the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 95 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, establishes a strong precedent for
the use of nonprejudicial human factors expert testimony that suggests a
conclusion regarding a set of facts that is outside the common knowledge
of the jurors. 96
ROBERT MuTH
B. United States v. Smith: Construing The Classified Information
Procedures Act As Restricting The Admissibility Of Evidence
Prior to 1980, the government occasionally faced situations in which a
defendant threatened to reveal classified information at trial simply to induce
90. See Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054-56 (holding that plaintiff's proffered human factors
expert testimony was admissible).
91. See id. at 1054-55 (admission of human factors expert testimony must satisfy Federal
Rules of Evidence 702 and 403).
92. See id. at 1055 (expert testimony that supplants jury's independent exercise of common
sense is prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
93. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (discussion of Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits' holdings in addressing admission of human factors expert testimony).
94. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text (discussion of Florida state court's
approach to admitting human factors expert testimony).
95. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Fourth Circuit's two-
step approach to admitting human factors expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence
702 and 403).
96. See Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054-56 (Fourth Circuit's holding that nonprejudicial human
factors expert testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
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the government to drop the case against him.' Rather than proceeding with
the prosecution and risking the disclosure of information that could jeop-
ardize national security or foreign relations, the government frequently
opted to abandon the prosecution.2 To minimize the "disclose or dismiss"
dilemma and thus reduce the risk of unnecessary disclosures 3 Congress
enacted the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).
4
CIPA provides judges with a comprehensive set of pretrial, trial, and
appellate procedures for determining the relevance and admissibility of
classified evidence.' In particular, CIPA requires a defendant who intends
to disclose, or cause the government to disclose, classified information to
notify the court and the government of his intent to reveal the classified
information. 6 CIPA provides for an in camera hearing by a court to
determine the "use, relevance, or admissibility" of the classified informa-
tion.' Should a court decide to admit the information, the government can
appeal the district court's decision to a court of appeals,8 and, even if the
court deems the classified information relevant and admissible, the govern-
ment can opt to substitute a summary of the material if the substitute
provides the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his
defense.9 The provisions of CIPA supplement the existing rules of evidence,
and Congress explicitly stated that CIPA must not alter any of the rules of
evidence.' 0 Congress, however, recognized the existence of judicial contro-
l. See Note, Graymail: Constitutional Immunity from Justice?, 18 HAdv. J. ON LEGIS.
389, 389-92 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Immunity] (discussing problem in which
defendant thyeatens to reveal classified information).
2. See generally S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ArninN. NEvs 4294 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 823]. "Graymail" occurs when a
defendant threatens to disclose classified information at trial in an effort to force the
government to dismiss the case. Id. To ensure protection of national security, prior to 1980,
the government often had to abandon the case. Id. If the government proceeded with the
prosecution, the government risked a court ruling requiring the government to disclose the
classified information because the information was relevant to the accused's defense. Id.; see
United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing graymail problem);
Note, Graymail: Constitutional Immunity (same); Note, Graymail: The Disclose or Dismiss
Dilemma in Criminal Prosecutions, 31 CASE W. REs. 84, 85 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Disclose
or Dismiss Dilemma] (same).
3. See Note, Disclose or Dismiss Dilemma, supra note 2, at 85 (referring to graymail
as "disclose or dismiss" dilemma for government); see also S. REP. No. 823, supra note 2,
at 1-4 (discussing Congress' intention that Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)
eliminate graymail problem); see also Collins, 720 F.2d at 1197 (discussing reason for "disclose
or dismiss" dilemma); supra note 2 and accompanying text (same).
4. 18 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1-16 (1983).
5. Id.; see infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing CIPA provisions).
6. 18 U.S.C. APP. § 5(a) (1983).
7. Id. § 6(a).
8. Id. § 7(a).
9. Id.
10. See S. REP. No. 823, supra note 2, at 8. When the Senate voted to enact CIPA, the
Senate specifically declared its intention to retain the existing rules of evidence, regardless of
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versy regarding the precise standard of admissibility of evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence (the Federal Rules)." In United States v. Smith, 2
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted the
issue of the applicable standard of admissibility of evidence under CIPA. 3
In Smith, the Army Intelligence Security Command (INSCOM) employed
Richard Craig Smith between 1973 and 1980.14 During 1982 and 1983, Smith
allegedly revealed the classified details of five INSCOM double agent
operations to Victor Okunev, a Soviet agent." According to Smith, two
men, White and Ishida, claiming to represent the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), approached Smith in Japan. 6 The two alleged agents recruited Smith
to help establish a double agent project directed toward the Russians in
Japan. 17 Although Smith never demanded to see identification from White
and Ishida, he believed their claims of allegiance to the CIA. 8 White and
Ishida convinced Smith that Smith had the authority to disclose the classified
information to Okunev to gain the Soviet agent's confidence. 19 In exchange
for supplying Okunev with the INSCOM details, Smith received $11,000
from Okunev. 20 The federal government subsequently brought suit in the
the sensitive nature of the information at issue. S. REP. No. 823, supra note 2, at 8. The
House of Representatives agreed that CIPA should not change the existing standards for
determining relevance and admissibility of evidence. H. REP. No. 831(I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
14 (1980); H.R. CoNF. Rap. No. 1436, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMxn. NEws 4307, 4310. Relying on legislative history, courts trying cases under
CIPA also have observed that CIPA creates no new substantive law. Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199.
Academic analyses further substantiate the claim that Congress did not intend for CIPA to
alter the existing rules of evidence. See Note, Constitutional Immunity, supra note 2, at 419
(CIPA does not change Rules of Evidence); Note, Disclose or Dismiss Dilemma, supra note
2, at 128 (same).
11. See Graymail: Hearing on S. 1482 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1980) [hereinafter Committee
on the Judiciary] (Morton H. Halperin, witness on behalf of the American Civil Liberties
Union, suggested that confusion existed regarding existing standard of admissibility of evidence).
12. 592 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 750 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated,
780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).
13. Id.




18. United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424, 428 (E.D. Va. 1984). In United States v.
Smith, the defendant claimed that White's and Ishida's familiarity with the details of secret
Army Intelligence Security Command (INSCOM) operations convinced him that White and
Ishida worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Id.
19. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1104. In Smith, defendant Smith alleged that, in addition to
assuaging Smith's apprehensions by persuading Smith that he had authority to reveal classified
information, White and Ishida also told Smith that the information Smith was to reveal to
the Russian agents would be worthless to the Russians because the CIA had discontinued the
operations to which the information related. Id.
20. Id.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, charging
Smith with five counts of espionage. 2
Pursuant to section 5(a) of CIPA, Smith notified the district court and
the government of his intention to introduce classified evidence to support
his defense.3 Smith intended to use the classified information to prove that
he believed that he was working for the CIA,2 an organization which would
not intentionally engage in espionage to the injury of the United States.Y
Such proof would negate criminal intent, an element necessary to the crime
of espionage.25 As required by section 6(a) of CIPA, the district court
conducted an in camera hearing to determine the relevance and admissibility
of the classified information. 26
In considering the admissibility of the classified information, the district
court observed that Congress did not intend for CIPA to alter the Federal
Rules regarding the relevance and admissibility of evidence. 27 Despite Con-
gress' clear intent that courts should apply the existing Federal Rules when
determining the admissibility of evidence, the government argued that,
because of the sensitivity of classified material, the district court should
apply a special standard of admissibility to classified information. 2 The
government argued that a court should balance the government's need to
21. Id. at 1103-04. In Smith, the government charged the defendant with five violations
of the Espionage Act. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 797-799 (1983) (Espionage Act).
22. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1104. See 18 U.S.C. APP. § 5(a) (1983) (describing notice
requirement in CIPA).
23. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1104.
24. Id.
25. Id. To be convicted of espionage under section 793, a defendant must be convicted
of obtaining national defense information with intent or reason to believe that the information
would either injure the United States or benefit a foreign nation. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1983).
Section 794 prohibits an individual from intending or attempting to communicate, deliver or
transmit national defense information or have reason to believe that he is communicating such
information. Id. at § 794(a).
26. Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 428-45.
27. Id. at 435. In Smith, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia noted that Congress did not intend to compromise a defendant's right to present
competent evidence when Congress enacted CIPA. Id.
28. Id. At trial in Smith, the government did not argue that the district court should
deny Smith the right to present evidence in support of his defense; rather, the government
argued that the court should exclude all classified evidence based on the sensitivity of the
information and the improbability of Smith's account. Id.
The government initially argued that Smith could not present any classified evidence
because Smith's factual allegations could not establish a legally cognizable defense. Id. at 428.
The district court rejected the government's contention on the ground that Smith's efforts to
negate the state of mind element of the espionage charges could establish a legally valid
defense. Id. at 428-34. The government also argued that the district court should exclude the
defendant's proffered evidence on the ground that Smith fabricated the allegations in an
attempt to force the government to dismiss the case rather than risk the disclosure of classified
evidence. Id. at 434. The government argued that, because Smith's attempt at graymail violated
the purpose of CIPA in preventing a forced dismissal of the prosecution, the district court
should exclude all of the classified information. Id. at 435.
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
keep the classified information confidential against the defendant's need to
reveal the information to support his defense. 29 The district court, however,
rejected the government's proposed standard of admissibility and instead
followed Congress' mandate to apply the Federal Rules in determining the
relevance and admissibility of classified information 0 The district court
also declined to apply a balancing test because the district court recognized
that a court is "ill-equipped" to determine fairly the potential harm disclo-
sure of classified material may cause to national security.3' The district
court concluded that a court must admit all relevant evidence to uphold
Congress' intent that CIPA leave intact the Federal Rules,32 and to assure
the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trialA3 Pursuant to section
7 of CIPA, the government appealed to a panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
34
On appeal to a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit, the government in
Smith contended that the district court erred by not balancing the potential
harm that disclosure of the classified information would cause to the nation's
security against the defendant's need for some of the concededly relevant
evidence in preparing his defense .3 A three-judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit disagreed with the government's interpretation of CIPA.36 Like the
district court, the three-judge panel recognized that, because only the
government designates the material as classifed, and only the government
adequately understands the necessity of keeping information confidential,
requiring a court to assess and balance the harm that disclosure of classified
29. Id. at 436. The government in Smith based its argument for a balancing test on
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules. Id.; FED. R. Evm. 403. Rule 403 provides in pertinent part,
"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . ." FED. R. Evm. 403. The government interpreted
"unfair prejudice" as encompassing harm that could potentially befall national security should
a court require disclosure of classified information. Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 436. Because of
this "prejudice," the prosecution argued that the court should weigh the probative value of
the relevant, but classified evidence. Id.
30. Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 435-36.
31. Id. at 436.
32. See id. at 435-37, 444 (concluding that Congress intended that courts comply with
Federal Rules when considering admissibility of classified information under CIPA).
33. See id. at 435-41, 444 (discussing defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial).
The district court in Smith noted that Congress did not intend to compromise a defendant's
tight to produce evidence at trial. Id. The district court realized that denying Smith the right
to present his factual defense would deny him the right to take the stand in his own defense.
Id. at 444. By excluding competent evidence, the court would deprive Smith of the use of
evidence that might establish his innocence or raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Id.; see
infra note 73 (discussing defendant's constitutional tight to present competent evidence).
34. See Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1216 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing government's appeal of
district court decision); 18 U.S.C. APr. § 7 (1983) (CIPA provisions allow government to take
interlocutory review of trial court ruling if trial court requires disclosure of classified evidence).
35. Smith, 750 F.2d at 1216.
36. Id. at 1217.
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information may have on national security is impractical.1 Moreover, the
three-judge panel reasoned that, if Congress had intended a court to balance
national security concerns against relevancy at the hearing stage, Congress
would have included a provision to that effect in CIPA .3
In addition to rejecting the government's contention that CIPA requires
a court to apply a balancing test to determine the admissibility of evidence,
the three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit also disagreed with the prose-
cution's application of the common law privileges delineated in Rule 501
of the Federal Rules.' 9 Rule 501 permits a party in a special relationship,
such as a physician-patient or an informer-law enforcer relationship, to
prevent disclosure of information obtained from that relationship. 40 The
government argued that, to protect national security, the court should grant
the government a privilege to withhold or prevent the disclosure of any
information which might endanger the security of the nation.4' The govern-
ment argued for a privilege by analogizing to the informer's privilege. 42 In
informer's privilege cases, courts permit the government to invoke a privilege
to protect the anonymity of persons supplying the state with information
regarding violations of law. 43 The availability of a privilege to withhold the
identity of an informer from a defendant depends on whether the govern-
ment's need to protect the sources of information outweighs the defendant's
need to obtain information to prepare his defense.44 In Smith, the govern-
37. Id. at 1217-18. The three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Smith relied on CIPA's definition of "classified information" to demonstrate
that CIPA covers information deemed confidential by the United States government pursuant
to an executive order, statute, or regulation. Id. As defined in section l(a) of CIPA, classified
information under CIPA "means any information or material that has been determined by
the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security. . . ." 18 U.S.C.
APP. § l(a) (1983). The three-judge panel for the Fourth Circuit in Smith recognized that
neither a court nor a defendant may challenge an executive classification of confidentiality.
Smith, 750 F.2d at 1217. Moreover, because the government did not supply the district court
with reasons why disclosure would harm national security, the three-judge panel could not
balance competently the harm to national security against the importance of the information
to the defendant's defense. Id. at 1218.
38. Smith, 750 F.2d at 1218.
39. Id. at 1219.
40. FED. R. Evm. 501. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political sub-
division thereof shall be governed by the principles of common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
Id.
41. Smith, 750 F.2d at 1219.
42. Id.; see infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing informer's privilege case
on which government in Smith relied in arguing that Fourth Circuit should apply balancing
test to determine admissibility of classified information).
43. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
44. See Smith, 750 F.2d at 1219 (recognizing limitation on informer's privilege that
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ment argued that the Fourth Circuit should apply a similar balancing test
to determine whether the government is entitled to a privilege for the
protection of national security.
45
The three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit refused to apply a balancing
test, distinguishing the informer's privilege situation from the Smith situa-
tion.46 The three-judge panel recognized that, in the case of an informer,
the government supplies the court with information about the reason for
withholding the name of the informer and the potential harm that could be
caused by disclosure. 47 A court, therefore, has more information available
to evaluate the government's need for a privilege to withhold information
than in an espionage case in which the government merely tells the court
that the government cannot release the information because disclosure
potentially may harm national security.48 The three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit noted that the government cannot invoke an informer's
privilege if the information is relevant and helpful to the defendant's
defense. 49 In Smith, the district court had determined that some of the
evidence Smith sought to introduce was relevant to his defense. 0 The three-
judge panel of the Fourth Circuit rejected the government's comparison of
Smith to informer's privilege cases, therefore, the government appealed the
decision to an en bane assembly of the Fourth Circuit."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted en
bane review 2 of Smith to determine whether the district court correctly
interpreted CIPA as prohibiting the application of a balancing test to
determine the admissibility of classified information.53 Although the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court that the classified evidence was relevant,
the Fourth Circuit declared that the district court must further analyze the
evidence to determine admissibility.54 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the
information must not be relevant or helpful to defense of accused); infra note 89 and
accompanying text (discussing policy reasons for granting informer's privilege).
45. Smith, 750 F.2d at 1219.
46. Id.; see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing Smith court's reasons
for rejecting government's argument for privilege).
47. Smith, 750 F.2d at 1219.
48. Id.; see Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 534 (district court in Smith determined that some,
but not all, classified information Smith sought to introduce was relevant to his defense of
lack of criminal intent).
49. See Smith, 750 F.2d at 1219 (discussing informer's privilege case of Roviaro); supra
notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing Roviaro).
50. Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 429, 444-45.
51. See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's review of
Smith).
52. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (definitions and conditions for granting rehearing en
banc). A court should grant a rehearing en banc when the case at issue involves an important
issue or when the full court must consider the issue to maintain consistent court decisions. Id.
53. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1104. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Smith focused on the construction and meaning of section 6 of CIPA to determine whether
the evidence the defendant sought to introduce was admissible. Id. at 1106.
54. Id. at 1106-07, 1110.
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government's contention that the court should exclude the classified infor-
mation at issue in Smith under a privilege analogous to the informer's
privilege.5 The informer's privilege is a statutorily granted privilege which
enables the government, in the interest of public policy, to withhold the
names of persons who supply the government with information of criminal
activity.5 6 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the government's interest in
protecting sensitive sources and methods of gathering information entitles
the government to a privilege similar to an informer's privilege. 57 Because
a court must balance the interests of the government and the right of the
defendant to prepare a defense in determining whether the government must
disclose an informer's identity, the Fourth Circuit insisted that a court
should follow a similar balancing procedure in ruling on classified infor-
mation introduced under CIPA. 8 The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that,
had Congress intended that a court unconditionally admit all relevant
evidence, Congress would have enacted such a provision in CIPA.5 9 The
Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the district court, stating
that, in determining whether to admit classified information, the district
court failed to recognize a governmental privilege and failed to balance the
public's interest in protecting national security against the defendant's right
to prepare his defense. 60
The dissent in Smith objected to the majority position that CIPA requires
a court to apply a balancing test to determine the admissibility of classified
information. 6' Instead, the dissent supported the district court's interpreta-
tion of CIPA as authorizing a court automatically to admit classified
evidence once a court determines that classified information is relevant to
the defense of the accused. 62 Like the three-judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit, the dissent noted that Congress considered and rejected a proposal
to include a stricter standard of admissibility than the admissibility standard
established by the Federal Rules. 63 Focusing on the legislative history of
CIPA, the dissent recognized Congress' desire to retain the existing standards
governing the relevance and admissibility of evidence. 4 The dissent also
rejected the majority's argument that the government is entitled to a privilege
similar to an informer's privilege.65 The dissent noted that in informer's
55. Id. at 1107-09.
56. See generally FED. R. Evw. 501 (describing privileges available to persons in specially
protected relationships).
57. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108-09.
58. See id. at 1107 (Fourth Circuit ruled that district court erred in not employing
balancing test to determine applicability of privilege for classified information).
59. Id. at 1110.
60. Id.
61. Id. at MI-13 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1111.
63. Id. at 1111-12; see infra notes 112-115 (discussing proposal rejected by Congress to
require stricter standard of admissibility).
64. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1113 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 1111-13 (distinguishing Smith situation from informer's privilege cases).
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privilege cases a defendant attempts to discover privileged information,
while in Smith, the defendant already possessed the information and the
government attempted to prevent the defendant from disclosing the infor-
mation. 6 Finally, the dissent opposed the application of a balancing test in
cases arising under CIPA because, in the dissent's view, CIPA adequately
protects the interests of all parties to a litigation.67
Congress enacted CIPA because the Federal Rules do not address spe-
cifically the admissibility of classified information. 61 Although Rule 501
prohibits a court from forcing a witness to disclose information obtained
from persons in a special, protected relationship, the rule specifies no
privilege for parties engaged in a relationship involving classified informa-
tion.69 Rule 402 and Rule 403 indicate that not all evidence automatically
is admissible." Rule 402 allows a court to admit only relevant evidence and
prohibits a court from admitting irrelevant evidence, 71 while Rule 403
requires that the probative value of the evidence must outweigh the possi-
bility of unfair prejudice before a court may'admit relevant evidence. 72
Although the application of Rule 403 may suppress relevant evidence, courts
invoke the rule only in extraordinary situations. 73 The Rules do not provide
66. Id. at 1112-13.
67. Id. at 1113.
68. Compare 42 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1-16 (1983) (provisions protecting classified information)
with FED. R. Evm. (no provisions for protecting classified evidence).
69. FED. R. Evm. 501; see supra note 40 (partial text of Rule 501).
70. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on admissibility
of relevant information in Rule 402 and Rule 403).
71. FED. R. Evm. 402.
72. FED. R. Evm. 403; see supra note 29 (partial text of Rule 403).
73. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 (5th Cir. 1982) (advocating sparing
use of "extraordinary remedy" of Rule 403); FED. R. Evm. 403 (permits exclusion of relevant
evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time). Due to the importance of
relevant evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, a court should exclude
relevant evidence only if the court can justify the exclusion on strong public policy grounds
with a basis in the Constitution or on statutory grounds. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 340 (1939). Moreover, no judicial support exists for the proposition that a court can
prevent a defendant from introducing relevant evidence known to the defendant. See United
States v. Godkins, 527 F.2d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1976) (court cannot restrict right of defendant
to supoena witness already known to defendant). The rationale for including all relevant
evidence in a trial has its foundation in the federal constitution, which guarantees a defendant
the right to a fair trial. See U.S. CoxsT. art. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendant right to
trial by impartial jury). Inherent in the right to a fair trial is the right of the accused to
present competent evidence in his own defense. See Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1119
(3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (denying defendant opportunity to present competent evidence is
violation of fair trial and due process); cf. Centoamore v. United States, 105 Neb. 452, 181
N.W. 182, 183 (1920) (recognizing importance of allowing defendant to produce evidence
relevant to his defense). A citizen possesses a powerful weapon in the right to insist that a
government disclose the evidence on which it seeks to convict a defendant. United States v.
Coplan, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950). Denying an accused access to relevant and material
evidence, therefore, violates due process and the defendant's right to a fair trial. Henderson,
631 F.2d at 1119; see United States v. Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1976) (denying
defendant opportunity to present proof violates due process); cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963) (government must not suppress evidence favorable to defense of accused).
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procedures for handling classified information and, therefore, a court should
favor a liberal rule of admissibility of relevant evidence.7 4 Courts should
apply a liberal standard of admissibility even when evaluating the admissi-
bility of classified information because Congress intended that CIPA leave
intact the existing rules of evidence.
7 5
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the issue of
admissibility of classified information under CIPA.7 6 Nevertheless, the nu-
merous courts that have ruled on CIPA cases agree that Congress did not
intend to alter the rules of evidence governing admissibility.7 7 Prior to
Smith, however, no court construing CIPA faced the double-edged sword
of deciding whether to admit concededly relevant, but highly classified
material. All of the courts that have addressed the admissibility of classified
information under CIPA have ruled that the evidence in question was
irrelevant under the ordinary rules of evidence, never reaching the question
of admissibility.75 Although confronting a CIPA issue of first impression,
the Smith court misinterpreted several of the prior CIPA decisions, failed
to consider others, and erroneously analogized the Smith situation to cases
involving the informer's privilege.
7 9
The Fourth Circuit in Smith overlooked the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Juan.0
Like the defendant in Smith, the defendant in Juan sought to introduce
classified evidence of his prior relationship with government agencies to
negate the criminal intent element of his drug charge." Pursuant to section
6 of CIPA, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
74. See United States v. 1,129.75 Acres of Land, More or Less in Cross & Poinsett
Counties, 473 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1973). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. 1,129.75 Acres of Land, More or Less in Cross & Poinsett
Counties declared that the Federal Rules of Evidence favor a broad rule of admissibility
designed to permit a court to receive all relevant information into evidence. Id. A court should
exclude relevant evidence for only a sound and practical reason. Id.
75. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to leave intact
rules of admissibility of evidence).
76. Cf. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1105, 1106 (implying that issue of admissibility of evidence
was issue of first impression).
77. See United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984) (Congress intended
that CIPA would not alter existing rules of evidence); United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195,
1199 (lth Cir. 1983) (same); Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 435 (same), aff'd, 750 F.2d at 1215,
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1102.
78. See United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984) (determining that classified
information was irrelevant and immaterial under ordinary rules of evidence); United States v.
Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984) (same).
79. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's failure to
consider a factually similar CIPA case); notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit's incorrect comparison of Smith with informer's privilege cases); notes 105-106 and
accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's misinterpretation of CIPA cases); notes 107-
116 and accompanying text (discussing legislative consideration of admissibility of evidence
under CIPA).
80. 776 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 258.
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Florida in Juan ruled that the classified information at issue was immaterial
and, therefore, not admissible at trial.8 2 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit in
Juan concluded that the district court erred in determining that the evidence
was immaterial. 3 The Eleventh Circuit admitted the evidence after the court
ruled that the evidence was relevant to the defense of the accused.8
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit relied solely on CIPA and the Federal
Rules governing relevance and admissibility to determine the admissibility
of the evidence.8 5 The Smith court, on the other hand, went beyond the
provisions of CIPA and required the application of a balancing test to
determine the admissibility of relevant information."
As a basis for its application of a balancing test, the Fourth Circuit
relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roviaro v. United
States.87 In Roviaro, the defendant sought to discover the identity of an
informer who actively participated in the defendant's alleged drug crime. 8
Recognizing the importance of the informer's privilege to effective law
enforcement, 9 the Supreme Court developed a balancing test for determining
the admissibility of relevant information.9 Under the Roviaro test, a court
must balance the public's interest in nondisclosure of confidential infor-
mation against the individual's right to prepare his defense. 91 The Supreme
Court allowed the government to withhold the information from the defend-
ant in Roviaro, but the Court cautioned that if the information was
"relevant and helpful" to the defense of the accused, the interests of the
defendant would outweigh the public interest in protecting the identity of
informers.Y
The Smith court incorrectly adopted the Roviaro balancing test as a
standard for determining admissibility of evidence in cases brought under
CIPA.93 The Fourth Circuit interpreted CIPA as requiring that, before a
82. Id. at 257.
83. Id. at 258. In United States v. Juan, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that the defendant could not introduce classified information tending
to demonstrate lack of criminal intent. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1104-10 (advocating use of balancing test to determine
admissibility of classified information).
87. 353 U.S. 53 (1957), aff'd sub nom., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
88. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 55-58. In Roviaro v. United States, the defendant averred that
an informer helped defendant acquire illegal drugs and that the informer could testify that the
defendant did not "knowingly" transport the drugs. Id. at 55.
89. Id. at 59 (informer's privilege furthers and protects public interest in law enforce-
ment).
90. Id. at 60-62; see infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing Roviaro
balancing test for purpose of determining applicability of informer's privilege).
91. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61.
92. Id.
93. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1111-13 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (discussing Fourth Circuit
majority's inappropriate application of Roviaro balancing test to CIPA cases); infra notes 107-
116 (discussing Congress' rejection of proposal to include Roviaro balancing test in CIPA).
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court admits relevant classified evidence, the court must determine that the
defendant's need for the information for his defense outweighs the harm
disclosure of the classified information potentially could cause to national
security. 94 The dissent in Smith correctly recognized that the Roviaro Court
applied the balancing test to evaluate the merits of the defendant's discovery
requests, not to determine the admissibility of evidence. 95 Because the
defendant in Smith already possessed the classified information, the court
did not require use of a balancing test to determine the defendant's right
to discover the information. 96 The only issue for the Smith court was the
issue of the admissibility of relevant evidence. 97 The Fourth Circuit erred
by not recognizing that the Roviaro standard applies to discovery requests,
not to questions of admissibility. 98
By failing to note that the Roviaro balancing test applies to the disclosure
of information in the discovery stage, the Fourth Circuit improperly inter-
preted the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision
in United States v. Pringle.9 In Pringle, the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts convicted the defendants of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and of possessing with intent
to import marijuana.10 The defendants sought to require the government
to disclose classified evidence relating to a surveillance operation.10 Follow-
ing an in camera ex parte hearing, the district court determined that the
evidence was neither relevant nor helpful to the defense, nor essential to a
fair determination of the case. 02 The district court, therefore, refused to
grant the defendant's discovery request.1 03
The Pringle court applied the Roviaro "relevant and helpful" language
and determined that the information the defendant in Pringle sought to
introduce was both irrelevant and inadmissible. 104 The Fourth Circuit, how-
ever, incorrectly interpreted Pringle as advocating the application of a
Roviaro-type balancing test to determine the admissibility of classified
94. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis
of CIPA § 6 as requiring balancing test to determine admissibility of classified information).
95. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1112-13 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
96. Compare Smith, 780 F.2d at 1104 (defendant possessed classified information) with
United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir. 1984) (defendant sought disclosure of
classified evidence not in his possession).
97. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1106.
98. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1111-13 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
99. 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984).
100. Id. at 422.
101. Id. at 422-23, 425.
102. Id. at 426.
103. Id. at 425-27. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United
States v. Pringle ruled that information regarding the government's surveillance operations of
the defendants' sailing vessel was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 426; see FED. R. CUM. P. 16 (regarding discovery and
inspection). The Pringle court also rejected defendants' contention that the government did
not proceed properly under the provisions of CIPA. Pringle, 751 F.2d at 426-27.
104. Pringle, 751 F.2d at 427-28.
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information. 105 In fact, the First Circuit applied the Roviaro balancing test
only to determine the relevancy of the classified information.'0
6
The Fourth Circuit's application of a Roviaro-type balancing test to
cases involving the admissibility of classified information also directly con-
travenes the express intent of Congress in enacting CIPA.107 The Senate
opposed any balancing test whatsoever, and specifically stated that a court
should not balance the government's national security interests against the
defendant's right to obtain classified information. 08 A court could interpret
Congress' declaration as a warning that courts should not engage in a
balancing process at the discovery stage, but that a court could apply a
balancing test to determine the admissibility of the evidence.' °9 In the context
of the legislative history of CIPA, however, a court more reasonably could
interpret Congress' caution as prohibiting courts from applying a balancing
test at any stage of litigation.'10 Moreover, Congress also declared that a
court should not consider the sensitivity of the information when ruling
upon the relevance and admissibility of the evidence."' The legislative history
of CIPA strongly indicates that Congress intended for courts to refrain
from applying a stricter standard of admissibility of evidence than required
by the existing rules, thereby preventing courts from impermissibly changing
the Federal Rules.
105. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1109-10; see id. at 1113 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
Smith from Pringle).
106. Pringle, 751 F.2d at 425-27.
107. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1111-12 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see supra note 10 and accom-
panying text (discussing Congress' intent in enacting CIPA); infra notes 112-116 (discussing
Congress' rejection of proposal to include Roviaro balancing test in CIPA).
108. S. REP. No. 823, supra note 2, at 9.
109. See 18 U.S.C. APP. § 4 (1983) (containing no requirement that court must use
balancing test at discovery stage of litigation).
110. See Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 436 n.16. The district court in Smith noted that the
Senate acknowledged that section 6(e)(2) of CIPA prohibits a court from balancing the
government's national security interests against the defendant's right to present a defense. Id.;
see 18 U.S.C. APP. § 6(e)(2) (1983) (permitting court to dismiss indictment when Attorney
General requires disclosure of classified information). The district court, however, concluded
that, if a court may apply a balancing test at the section 6(e)(2) stage, a court by implication
may not apply a balancing test at any time when it determines the admissibility of evidence.
Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 436 n.16; see Smith, 750 F.2d at 1218 (court may not apply balancing
test when determining admissibility of evidence).
111. S. REP. No. 823, supra note 2, at 8. In formulating the CIPA provisions, the Senate
stated that a court should disregard the classified nature of the information at issue when
determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence because CIPA procedures should not
preclude the defendant from using relevant evidence in support of his defense. Id.; see United
States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985) (court should not consider sensitivity of
information when ruling on admissibility of information). Contra United States v. Collins,
603 F. Supp. 301, 302 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (suggesting that courts should consider classified nature
of information at CIPA § 6(c) substitution stage). No provision of CIPA, not even section
6(c), requires a court to apply a balancing test at any stage of the proceedings. See generally
18 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1-16 (1983) (no requirement that court balance sensitivity of information
against defendant's need for classified information).
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Congress not only insisted that CIPA leave unaltered the rules of
evidence, but Congress also specifically refused to adopt a proposal to
include a Roviaro standard of admissibility.'1 2 Congress rejected a suggestion
to require that the information requested be "relevant and helpful" to the
defense of the accused, not just relevant, before a court could require the
government to disclose the information."' Congress recognized that the
judiciary requested Congress to include a Roviaro relevant and helpful
standard in CIPA to create a stricter standard of admissibility of evidence
for cases involving classified information. 1 4 Congress, however, continued
to insist that CIPA not change the existing rules of admissibility." 5 By
utilizing a Roviaro-type standard in its construction of CIPA, the Fourth
Circuit violated Congress' intent to omit a "relevant and helpful" standard
and to leave unchanged the rules of evidence." 6
By applying a stricter standard of admissibility to cases involving class-
ified information, the Fourth Circuit in Smith wrought a subtle, but
significant, change on both CIPA and the rules of evidence.17 The Fourth
Circuit added another step in the evaluation of classified information. By
requiring the evidence to pass a balancing test, the defendant now must
show a strong need for the evidence even after demonstrating relevancy." 8
Under the existing Federal Rules, the information Smith sought to introduce
would have been admissible because the information was relevant to his
112. See infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' consideration
and rejection of proposal to Congress to include Roviaro relevant and helpful standard in
CIPA to determine admissibility of evidence); see also Smith, 780 F.2d at 1111-12 (Butzner,
J., dissenting) (discussing judiciary's proposal to include Roviaro standard of admissibility of
evidence in CIPA).
113. See Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 11, at 3, 18 (proposing adoption of
relevant and material standard in CIPA).
114. Id. at 44. At a hearing on CIPA before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, a
witness testifying on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union noted that Congress intended
to retain the existing standards for the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. Id.
Although the witness conceded that confusion exists among the courts regarding the exact
standard of admissibility required by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the witness objected to
the judiciary's proposal to include a "relevant and helpful" or "relevant and material"
standard in CIPA to a stricter standard for admissibility of classified evidence. Id. The witness
would have agreed to the judiciary's proposal if the judiciary could have convinced him that
the relevant and helpful standard was the generally accepted standard used to determine the
admissibility of evidence. Id.
115. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (emphasizing Congress' intent to leave
unchanged the rules of evidence).
116. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1106-10 (applying Roviaro balancing test to Smith).
117. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1112 (Butzner, J., dissenting) The dissent in Smith contended
that, by applying a Roviaro standard to exclude evidence known to the defendant, rather than
restricting the Roviaro standard to evaluations of discovery requests, the Fourth Circuit
significantly altered the existing standard for determining the admissibility of evidence. Id.
118. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1110 (interpreting CIPA as requiring court to determine
admissibility of evidence after determining relevance in light of suggested governmental privilege
allowing for special protection of national security).
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defense. 1 9 When the Fourth Circuit applied the Roviaro-type standard,
however, the court denied Smith the opportunity to introduce the same
relevant evidence. 20 Congress enacted CIPA to serve as a procedural tool
to eliminate needless disclosures of classified evidence.12' Congress did not
intend to deprive a defendant of rights simply because he seeks to introduce
classified evidence.'2
The Smith court's decision to apply a balancing test to CIPA cases not
only disregards the intent of Congress, but the decision also imposes a
difficult burden on a court. 12 The judiciary takes no part in the initial
classification of information, 12 4 therefore courts reasonably cannot foresee
the consequences of disclosing classified information. 2' Without the means
to predict the potential harm disclosure of classified information may cause
to national security, a court cannot balance fairly the government's interest
in nondisclosure against an individual's need for the information.
Policy considerations other than the practical difficulty of employing a
balancing test militate against the standard of admissibility adopted by the
Fourth Circuit.2 6 The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of CIPA benefits the
government to the disadvantage of the defendant because, theoretically, the
government always could argue that the security of the entire nation
outweighs the interests of a single individual. 27 Congress, however, recog-
nized the government's potentially unfair advantage when Congress enacted
CIPA. l 21 The legislative history of CIPA indicates that Congress continually
emphasized the importance of an individual's right to a fair trial. 2 9 Just as
119. See Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424 (determining that, under existing rules of evidence,
defendant's classified information was relevant and admissible); Smith, 750 F.2d at 1215
(same).
120. See Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (determining that, under balancing test, some relevant
classified evidence defendant sought to introduce was inadmissible).
121. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of CIPA).
122. See Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 435 (recognizing Congress' determination not to com-
promise defendant's right to present evidence).
123. See infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text (discussing practical difficulties of
applying balancing test to classified information).
124. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (recognizing that government has sole
discretion in classifying information).
125. See United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258-59 (11th Cir. 1985) (disclosure of
seemingly harmless information may be dangerous to national security); supra note 37 and
accompanying text (court cannot judge harm disclosure classified information may cause to
national security if court does not know why government classified information).
126. See infra notes 127-132 (discussing policy reasons for not applying balancing test to
determinations of. admissibility of classified evidence).
127. Cf. Note, Disclose or Dismiss Dilemma, supra note 2, at 31 (observing that CIPA,
even without balancing test, favors government's interest in providing fair trials over defendants'
right to fair trials).
128.- See infra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' recognition of
individual's right to fair trial under CIPA). But see United States v. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. 229
(D.Md. 1981) (upholding constitutionality of CIPA §§ 4 and 6).
129. See S. REP. No. 823, supra note 2, at 8 (court should not deny defendant use of
evidence that defendant could introduce if information was not classified); id. at 9 (court
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courts ruling on an informer's privilege conceded that the privilege must
yield to requirements of fundamental fairness,1Y0 Congress also realized the
necessity of permitting a defendant to produce material evidence affecting
a determination of his guilt or innocence.' 3' Although a court must employ
a different set of procedures in ruling on the admissibility of classified
information, the court still must uphold the defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial.
3 2
Disregarding and misinterpreting case precedent 3 3 and legislative his-
tory, 134 the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Smith erroneously interpreted
CIPA as requiring a court to determine whether evidence is admissible
under a balancing test, as well as whether the evidence is relevant. 135 Congress
did not intend to change the substantive rules of evidence when it enacted
CIPA, 3 6 therefore, the Smith court improperly and needlessly developed its
own procedures for evaluating the admissibility of relevant, but classified
information.137 To avoid violating a defendant's constitutional rights when
a defendant seeks to disclose classified information at trial, a court should
adhere to the provisions outlined in CIPA.
13s
MONICA L. MrLER
should not balance national security interests against right of defendant to obtain information);
see also Smith, 592 F. Supp. at 435 (noting that Congress did not intend to compromise
defendant's rights by implementing CIPA).
130. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957) (informer's privilege must yield
to fundamental fairness).
131. See S. REP. No. 823, supra note 2, at 8-9. The Senate, in considering whether to
enact CIPA, recognized that a court must not prejudice a defendant by ruling that the
government need not disclose relevant classified evidence. Id. at 9. Specifically, the Senate
noted that a court considering the admissibility or evidence under CIPA should not deny a
defendant the use of information that the defendant could use under the Federal Rules. Id.
at 8; see supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's constitutional right to
present evidence in his defense).
132. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for introducing
classified information under CIPA); supra note 73 (discussing defendant's constitutional right
to fair trial).
133. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (suggesting that Fourth Circuit's
analysis of Pringle was erroneous).
134. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's refusal
to recognize Congress' intention to omit Roviaro standard from CIPA).
135. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's decision
to apply balancing test in construing admissibility of evidence under CIPA).
136. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to leave
unaltered the existing rules of evidence).
137. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1113 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourth Circuit
majority needlessly departed from CIPA procedures and rules of admissibility of evidence).
138. Id.; see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing CIPA provisions); notes
80-86 and accompanying text (noting that First Circuit in United States v. Juan applied existing
rules of evidence in determining admissibility of evidence).
